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Does the European Marriage Pattern 
Explain Economic Growth?
 
TRACY DENNISON AND SHEILAGH OGILVIE 
 
This article scrutinizes the recently postulated link between the European 
Marriage Pattern (EMP) and economic success. Multivariate analysis of 4,705 
demographic observations, covering women’s marriage age, female lifetime 
celibacy, and household complexity in 39 European countries, shows that the 
most extreme manifestations of the EMP were associated with economic 
stagnation rather than growth. There is no evidence that the EMP improved 
economic performance by empowering women, increasing human capital 
investment, adjusting population to economic trends, or sustaining beneficial 
cultural norms. European economic success was not caused by the EMP and its 
sources must therefore be sought in other factors. 
  
istorical demography has attracted much attention in recent  
years, as economists have begun to incorporate demographic 
behavior into theories of long-run growth. Several recent contributions 
to this literature focus on household formation patterns, arguing  
that the explanation for western economic success was the European 
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Marriage Pattern (henceforth EMP), a demographic system involving 
late marriage for women (above 23–24 years), high proportions never 
marrying (above c. 10–15 percent), and predominantly nuclear families 
(above c. 80 percent).1 The EMP was originally put forward by John 
Hajnal (1965, 1982, 1983) not as a cause of economic success, but as  
an empirical regularity—a demographic pattern that could be observed 
across Europe west of an imaginary line from St. Petersburg to Trieste. 
Between the 1960s and the 1990s scholars occasionally speculated 
about links between the EMP and economic growth (Landes 1969; 
Todd 1983; Laslett 1988; Solar 1995), but the vast bulk of research 
on the EMP was empirical, investigating its prevalence, functioning, 
and social context. A number of recent works, however, argue that 
the EMP played a major causal role in European economic growth 
(Greif 2006; Greif and Tabellini 2010; De Moor and Van Zanden 
2010; Foreman-Peck 2011; Voigtländer and Voth 2006, 2013).  
 Proponents of this argument hold that the EMP was crucial for  
the “Great Divergence” between Europe and the rest of the world, 
particularly China (Greif 2006; Greif and Tabellini 2010; De Moor  
and Van Zanden 2010; Voigtländer and Voth 2006). They also argue  
that the EMP can explain the “Little Divergence” between northwest 
Europe and the rest of the continent after the Black Death (De Moor and 
Van Zanden 2010; Voigtländer and Voth 2006, 2013; Foreman-Peck 
2011). Some contend that the EMP can be found in its most “pure”  
or “extreme” manifestation in England and the Low Countries in the  
early modern period, where it is supposed to have been central to these 
societies’ successful economic growth and, in the case of England, early 
industrialization (De Moor and Van Zanden 2010, p. 4; Voigtländer  
and Voth 2006, pp. 323, 348). As we discuss in later sections of  
this article, the different proponents of this view emphasize different 
(though often overlapping) causal mechanisms, variously arguing that 
the EMP benefited economic growth by improving women’s position, 
increasing human capital investment, adjusting population growth to 
economic trends, sustaining beneficial cultural norms, or fostering 
corporative institutions. But all contend that the EMP played a central 
role in European economic growth in the centuries before and during 
industrialization.  
 These are strong claims and, if true, would have far-reaching 
implications for growth theories and policy interventions. It is therefore 
important to establish whether these arguments can be justified. 
  
1 On these quantitative indicators, see Hajnal (1965, pp. 102–03, 108; 1982, p. 482; 1983,  
p. 69). Fauve-Chamoux (2001, pp. 224–25) suggests that the boundaries should be set at  
the somewhat higher female age at first marriage of 25 and at 8–14 percent female lifetime 
celibacy. 
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This article presents the results of a quantitative analysis of over four 
thousand observations of demographic behavior, covering marriage 
age, lifetime celibacy, and family complexity, in more than thirty 
European societies between 1500 and 1900, drawn from 365 
publications in historical demography. We use these data, together with 
research on the interaction between demography and the economy 
across early modern Europe, to investigate recent claims that the EMP 
was the key to economic growth. Our findings cast serious doubt on the 
idea that this demographic system can be used to explain European 
economic success. Rather, they indicate strongly that the causes of 
historical economic growth must be sought in other factors. 
 The article begins, in Section 2, by presenting our large data  
set drawn from the historical demography literature, which we use 
in Section 3 to investigate whether the most “pure” or “extreme” 
manifestations of the EMP were indeed found in those European 
societies where economic growth was rapid and industrialization was 
early. Section 4 turns to the first of several mechanisms by which the 
EMP is supposed to have caused economic growth, by guaranteeing 
women a high economic status. A second causal mechanism is explored 
in Section 5, which assesses the relationship between the EMP, human 
capital investment, and early modern growth. Section 6 examines the 
argument that the EMP encouraged faster economic growth in England 
(or Europe) by ensuring better demographic responsiveness to economic 
conditions. Section 7 investigates the idea that the EMP was associated 
with distinctively European cultural beliefs that contributed to European 
economic success. Section 8 draws together the implications of 
our findings for understanding the demographic and institutional bases 
for long-term economic growth. 
 
A Data Set on European Historical Demography 
 
 Fortunately, there is abundant evidence on demographic behavior 
across premodern Europe. From 365 research studies in European 
historical demography (listed in the Online Appendix), we have 
compiled a data set of 4,705 observations of demographic behavior  
and family forms. As Table 1 shows, these data comprise 2,622 
observations of female age at first marriage, 1,172 observations of 
female lifetime celibacy, and 911 observations of the kin complexity 
of households, covering 39 European countries between the early 
sixteenth and the late nineteenth century. Our data set is thus an order  
of magnitude larger than the most sizable previous compilations:  
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR REGRESSION VARIABLES 
Variable 
Female Age at  
First Marriage  
(years) 
Female Lifetime 
Celibacy  
(%) 
Household 
Complexity  
(%) Total 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Country        
Austria 33 26.8 25 28.0 24 19.2 82 
Baltics 8 25.8 20 18.1 65 48.3 93 
Belarus 2 18.5 0 — 2 56.5 4 
Belgium 197 26.4 17 20.4 6 13.1 220 
Bohemia 100 25.2 59 14.4 11 9.4 170 
Bulgaria 17 19.1 7 0.6 9 36.1 33 
Croatia 1 20.0 1 2.0 5 67.7 7 
Denmark 46 27.8 32 11.3 11 14.9 89 
England 250 25.2 45 11.3 70 15.7 365 
Finland 25 24.8 1 15.0 42 43.2 68 
France (all) 93 24.8 86 12.0 0 — 179 
France (northern) 192 25.3 137 11.5 27 16.1 356 
France (central) 11 23.3 23 10.9 5 44.0 39 
France (southern) 46 24.3 73 12.9 30 27.3 149 
Germany 486 26.1 103 11.4 28 12.0 617 
Greece 14 21.9 7 5.3 13 16.7 34 
Hungary 76 20.4 9 4.0 45 51.6 130 
Iceland 3 28.1 3 25.9 15 24.2 21 
Ireland 74 24.2 53 15.8 16 25.5 143 
Italy (all) 5 23.7 5 11.9 0 — 10 
Italy (northern) 113 24.1 43 11.8 86 34.4 242 
Italy (southern) 134 22.1 38 12.1 87 20.9 259 
Malta 2 22.8 5 21.8 0 — 7 
Netherlands 213 26.5 16 9.5 37 17.6 266 
Norway 22 27.1 23 17.3 21 21.9 66 
Poland 19 22.8 12 6.2 46 27.0 77 
Portugal 34 25.0 22 22.7 3 26.7 59 
Romania 5 20.3 3 2.9 0 — 8 
Russia 57 20.0 24 9.3 69 60.6 150 
Scotland 42 26.0 103 20.7 6 25.5 151 
Serbia 9 19.6 5 1.1 4 44.9 18 
Slovakia 3 20.9 0 — 2 40.5 5 
Slovenia 9 27.7 1 0.1 8 32.5 18 
Spain (all) 8 23.5 10 11.6 0 — 18 
Spain (northern) 149 24.2 57 10.0 52 20.3 258 
Spain (central) 18 22.9 21 7.2 7 32.1 46 
Spain (southern) 16 22.1 22 10.4 5 5.5 43 
Sweden 56 26.6 45 12.8 36 21.4 137 
Switzerland 30 25.9 15 19.6 16 19.9 61 
Ukraine 4 19.6 1 2.0 2 42.8 7 
 The European Marriage Pattern 655 
  
  
TABLE 1 — continued 
Variable 
Female Age at  
First Marriage  
(years) 
Female Lifetime 
Celibacy  
(%) 
Household 
Complexity  
(%) Total 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Century        
Sixteenth century 48 22.3 16 13.8 19 31.3    83 
Seventeenth century 257 24.6 94 10.6 61 20.0  412 
Eighteenth century 970 24.9 464 12.8 363 29.4   1,797 
Nineteenth century   1,347 25.2 598 14.3 468 31.7   2,413 
Date approximate 108 23.9 54 13.2 23 25.2      185 
Unit of observation        
Nation 274 24.9 239 12.9 3 23.9  516 
Region 500 24.6 570 13.5 137 34.0   1,207 
Community   1,476 25.0 324 13.0 707 29.8   2,507 
Group 372 25.4 39 17.7 64 23.3      475 
Rural or urban        
City 233 25.1 82 14.7 80 13.5  395 
Small town 337 24.7 88 13.6 103 17.3  528 
Village/rural   1,499 25.0 311 13.3 690 34.2   2,500 
Mixed rural/urban 553 24.9 691 13.2 38 23.1   1,282 
Publication type        
Monograph 652 25.7 135 14.7 67 21.9  854 
Journal article   1,145 24.8 702 13.1 405 31.9   2,252 
Working paper 53 23.6 41 11.9 20 39.6  114 
Volume chapter 132 24.0 42 10.8 146 32.4  320 
Secondary source 640 24.8 252 14.0 273 27.1   1,165 
Sources and methods        
AFM reconstitution   1,239 25.3 0 — 0 —   1,239 
AFM census 510 23.7 0 — 0 —  510 
AFM other 296 25.2 0 — 0 —  296 
AFM unknown method 577 25.3 0 — 0 —  577 
Celibacy deaths 0 — 387 12.3 0 —  387 
Celibacy census 0 — 705 13.9 0 —  705 
Celibacy other 0 — 54 12.6 0 —    54 
Celibacy unknown  
method 
0 — 26 15.7 0 —    26 
Total observations   2,622 25.0   1,172 13.4 911 30.0   4,705 
Notes: Household complexity = kin complexity of households (types 4 and 5 in Laslett-Hammel 
classification). 
Baltics = Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (hypothesis testing showed no significant demographic 
differences). 
Date approximate = date reported with some degree of approximation (e.g., “mid-eighteenth 
century”). 
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TABLE 1 — continued 
Nation = unit of observation is an entire country. 
Region = unit of observation is province, district, feudal estate, or other subnational unit. 
Community = unit of observation is single city, town, village, hamlet, or other settlement. 
Group = unit of observation is subgroup of larger population (stratum, religion, occupation, 
wealth-group, etc.). 
City = settlement(s) with urban status and population over 10,000. 
Small town = settlement(s) with urban status and population 2,000–10,000. 
Village/rural = settlement(s) lacking urban status and/or with population under 2,000. 
Mixed rural/urban = population combining inhabitants of urban and rural settlements. 
Monograph = observation derived from book reporting author’s own research findings. 
Journal article = observation derived from journal article reporting author’s own research 
findings. 
Working paper = observation derived from working paper or unpublished dissertation reporting 
author’s own research findings. 
Volume chapter = observation derived from chapter in edited volume reporting author’s own 
research findings. 
Secondary source = observation reported in a secondary source by author other than original 
researcher. 
AFM reconstitution = marriage age calculated from registers of vital events using 
family reconstitution. 
AFM census = marriage age calculated from census using Hajnal’s SMAM method. 
AFM other = marriage age calculated using other sources/methods (marriage licenses, 
inventories, etc.). 
AFM unknown method = marriage age calculated using unreported sources/methods. 
Celibacy deaths = celibacy calculated from burial registers using marital status at death. 
Celibacy census = celibacy calculated from censuses using marital status at post-reproductive 
ages. 
Celibacy other = celibacy calculated using other sources/methods (inventories, court records, 
etc.). 
Celibacy unknown method = celibacy calculated using unreported sources/methods. 
Sources: The 365 research studies in historical demography (see the text and the Online 
Appendix). 
 
the 83 household complexity rates for 11 European societies presented 
by Peter Laslett (1977); the 52 household complexity rates for 12 
European societies published by Brian Bradley and Franklin 
Mendels (1978); the 139 female marriage ages for seven western 
European societies assembled by Michael Flinn (1981); or the 71 
female celibacy rates for 3 eastern-central European societies 
compiled by Markus Cerman (2001). The size and comprehensive 
coverage of our data set provide a robust basis for assessing recent 
theories about the EMP. 
 These recent theories largely focus on cross-cultural rather than 
chronological differences after the Black Death.2 Our multivariate 
analyses, by contrast, use century dummies to ensure that apparent 
country differences are not merely reflecting biased availability of  
  
2 Most contributions to this new literature date the emergence of the EMP to the Black Death; 
the exceptions are Greif (2006, pp. 308–19) and Greif and Tabellini (2010, pp. 137–38) who 
hold that a nuclear-family-based pattern began to benefit European growth as early as the ninth 
century. 
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data for different societies at different periods. Studies in historical 
demography report their findings for different time periods depending 
on survival of archival sources, hypotheses to be tested, and analytical 
convenience. Without access to the underlying data, our compilation 
could not impose a standardized periodization. Some observations in the 
data set thus refer to individual years, others to single decades, quarter-
centuries, or centuries, and still others to irregular periods determined 
by documentary survival or other factors. For all research studies used, 
all observations for all periods reported were included in the data set, 
regardless of the length of the periods. In the multivariate analysis 
below, we discuss broad changes over time for Europe as a whole, 
though space constraints in this article preclude detailed discussion  
of the separate chronological trajectories of different demographic 
indicators in different countries. 
 Before the nineteenth century, national-level statistics are rare,  
so our data are drawn from studies carried out at different levels of 
aggregation, with only 11 percent of observations at the level of entire 
countries, 26 percent at the level of regions (provinces, administrative 
districts, feudal estates, clusters of settlements for which archival sources 
survive), and 53 percent at the level of individual communities (cities, 
towns, villages, hamlets).3 The remaining 10 percent of observations 
referred to particular social strata (wealthy, middling, poor), occupational 
groups (sharecroppers, merchants, craftsmen, factory workers), religious 
confessions (Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox Christians), or places 
of origin (migrants, natives, migrants’ spouses). All data were coded for 
unit of observation so that the multivariate analyses could control for 
potential biases.  
 Documentary sources and hence data availability in historical 
demography also differ considerably between cities, towns and villages. 
Urban centers were better (and differently) documented than villages, 
even though villagers made up a large majority of European populations 
throughout most of the period under analysis. To control for biases that 
might be imparted by such differences in documentation, all data were 
coded for whether they referred to large cities (about 8 percent of 
observations), small towns (11 percent), villages (53 percent), or mixed 
populations of villagers and townspeople (27 percent). 
 A survey such as ours must take into account potential publication 
bias: the possibility that the form in which research findings are 
disseminated is correlated with their content. Unpublished studies may 
  
3 Regional studies cannot always be clearly distinguished from community studies: 
for instance, when an entire administrative district or feudal estate contained only a 
few hundred inhabitants scattered in small hamlets, each with only a few households, it is 
arguably more appropriate to treat the entire unit as a “community.” 
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be less reliable because they have not been able to achieve publication, 
but may also be more representative since their results have not been 
censored by an established consensus. Different types of published 
study may reflect differing degrees and types of peer review. To control 
for the possibility that published studies are not representative of all 
valid studies undertaken, or that type of publication may cause other 
forms of sample selection bias, we coded all data according to whether 
they were presented as the original research of the author in a journal 
article (48 percent of our observations), a monograph (18 percent),  
a volume chapter (7 percent), an unpublished working paper or 
dissertation (under 3 percent), or alternatively were reported as another 
author’s finding in a secondary source (25 percent of observations); we 
regarded it as important to include data from secondary sources so as to 
overcome any selection bias towards national languages and literatures 
with which we were more familiar.  
 We also took account of the potential for differing sources and 
methods to bias historical demographic results (for important reflections 
on this issue, see Ruggles 1999). For age at first marriage, each 
observation was coded according to whether it was calculated by 
applying the method of family reconstitution to registers of vital events 
(which was the case with 47 percent of observations), by using Hajnal’s 
Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) method on census-type 
listings (19 percent), by other recorded sources and methods such as 
ages reported in marriage licenses or marriage contracts (11 percent), or 
by unreported sources and methods (which was the case for 22 percent 
of observations, mainly those from secondary studies). For female 
lifetime celibacy, each observation was coded according to whether  
it was calculated from marital status at death using burial registers  
(33 percent of observations), marital status in post-reproductive age-
groups using census-type listings (60 percent), other recorded sources 
and methods such as biographical details in court records or probate 
inventories (less than 5 percent), or not reported at all (just over 2 
percent of observations, mainly from secondary studies).  
 In this article, we use these data to explore recent claims that the most 
successful early modern economies, England and the Netherlands, had 
the most pure or extreme manifestation of the EMP, since this empirical 
assertion is widely adduced as demonstrating the causal effect of the 
EMP on economic growth. We list the research studies on which the 
data set is based in an Online Appendix, to facilitate further consultation 
by other scholars.  
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Multivariate Analysis of European Marriage Patterns 
 
 If the EMP was responsible for economic growth, one would  
expect to find it in rich and rapidly growing economies and not in  
poor and slowly growing ones. This is precisely the argument advanced  
by the recent literature, which claims that the EMP was a distinctive 
characteristic of the Netherlands, the miracle economy of Europe up to 
c. 1670, and England, which grew rapidly after c. 1700 and experienced 
the first Industrial Revolution after c. 1780. According to Tine de Moor 
and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2010, p. 4), for instance, the EMP emerged 
“in the North Sea area—in England and the Low Countries in 
particular—and it was ... the long-term dynamism of this structure 
which helps to explain the long-term success of this region in the world 
economy of the early modern period.” In this account, the “core area” of 
the EMP consisted of Flanders, the coastal Netherlands, and eastern 
England, while a less “pure” manifestation of the pattern was found  
in the wider North Sea area. Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim  
Voth (2006, pp. 323, 348) adopt the even more restrictive view that 
“England practiced an extreme form of the ‘European marriage 
pattern’”; this, they claim, created the “low-pressure” demographic 
conditions for England’s economic superiority compared to China, 
southern and eastern Europe, and even France. 
 England and the Netherlands certainly displayed early and rapid 
economic growth by European standards. Macroeconomic estimates  
for Europe before 1800 have many recognized weaknesses, and lack  
the precision, coverage, and degree of disaggregation required to attach 
them to observations in our data set. However, the series compiled  
by Angus Maddison is widely used as a basis for rough comparisons 
across national units (see the data and documentation available  
online at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm).  
Figure 1 shows the Maddison estimates of per capita GDP in a number 
of northwest European societies during the 350 years after 1500, the 
period during which the EMP is supposed to have played a causal role 
in economic growth. Per capita GDP in England and the Netherlands 
clearly surpassed that in the other countries shown in Figure 1, and 
indeed all the other countries for which Maddison provides estimates 
between 1500 and 1850. Future research studies will certainly improve 
these estimates in detail, but seem unlikely to cast doubt on English and 
Dutch economic primacy; indeed, recent revisions increase the lead of 
the Netherlands over other European economies before 1820 (Bolt and 
Van Zanden 2013). Without question, England and the Netherlands had 
the most successful economies in Europe throughout the early modern 
period.  
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FIGURE 1 
PER CAPITA GDP AND EXTREMENESS OF THE EUROPEAN MARRIAGE PATTERN, 
1500–1850 
 
Source: Angus Maddison, Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 
1-2008 AD (Vertical file, copyright Angus Maddison, University of Groningen) 
[http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/vertical-file_02-2010.xls].  
 
 But did they manifest a more “pure” or “extreme” form of the  
EMP? Hardly. Table 2 presents a multivariate analysis of the 2,622 
observations of female age at first marriage for the 39 European 
societies in our data set. It covers the four centuries between c. 1500 
and c. 1900, the period during which, it is claimed, the exceptional 
strength of the EMP in England and the Netherlands played a causal 
role in their economic success. The regression confirms the importance 
of controlling for time in cross-cultural analyses of demographic 
behavior, since it reveals a significant rise in marriage age between the 
sixteenth and the nineteenth century.4  
 The regression also confirms the importance of controlling for 
characteristics of the underlying research studies. Hypothesis testing on 
the results in Table 2 reveals that community- and group-level 
studies reported significantly (though only slightly) higher marriage  
 
  
4 Throughout this article, “significant” means the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 level. 
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TABLE 2 
FEMALE AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE: REGRESSION RESULTS 
(omitted country is England) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Country   
Denmark  2.36 0.32*** 
Iceland  2.07 1.04** 
Slovenia  1.66 0.61*** 
Norway  1.22 0.41*** 
Sweden  1.21 0.27*** 
Austria  1.03 0.34*** 
Belgium  0.79 0.19*** 
Netherlands  0.74 0.19*** 
Switzerland  0.72 0.35** 
Scotland  0.69 0.33** 
Germany  0.65 0.15*** 
France (northern)  0.03 0.18 
Baltics –0.01 0.65 
Bohemia –0.21 0.23 
Portugal –0.51 0.34 
France (all) –0.76 0.26*** 
Finland –0.90 0.38** 
France (central) –0.95 0.56* 
Spain (northern) –1.28 0.20*** 
France (southern) –1.29 0.29*** 
Ireland –1.44 0.26*** 
Italy (northern) –1.48 0.22*** 
Italy (all) –2.11 0.81*** 
Spain (all) –2.15 0.65*** 
Spain (central) –2.39 0.44*** 
Poland –2.77 0.44*** 
Malta –2.79 1.26** 
Italy (southern) –3.18 0.23*** 
Spain (southern) –3.38 0.47*** 
Greece –3.65 0.50*** 
Slovakia –4.97 1.04*** 
Hungary –5.29 0.24*** 
Romania –5.56 0.81*** 
Russia –5.70 0.29*** 
Ukraine –6.00 0.90*** 
Croatia –6.00 1.78*** 
Serbia –6.22 0.62*** 
Bulgaria –6.76 0.46*** 
Belarus –6.81 1.29*** 
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TABLE 2 — continued 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Century   
Sixteenth century –2.65 0.28*** 
Seventeenth century –0.90 0.13*** 
Eighteenth century –0.33 0.09*** 
Unit of Observation   
Region 0.14 0.20 
Group 0.43 0.23* 
Community 0.55 0.23** 
Rural or urban   
Small town –0.52 0.16*** 
Village/rural 0.05 0.14 
Mixed rural/urban 0.49 0.19*** 
Publication type   
Monograph –0.08 0.11 
Working paper 0.17 0.28 
Volume chapter –0.04 0.17 
Secondary source –0.12 0.11 
Sources and methods   
AFM census 0.02 0.14 
AFM other –0.02 0.15 
AFM unknown method 0.32 0.12*** 
Constant 25.26 0.28*** 
* Significant at the 0.10 level.  
** Significant at the 0.05 level.  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Notes: N = 2,622. Adj. R2 = 0.5227. 
Variable definitions: See Table 1. 
Country: omitted category is England. Century: omitted category is nineteenth.  
Unit of observation: omitted category is nation. Rural/urban: omitted category is city. 
Publication type: omitted category is journal article.  
Sources and methods: omitted category is AFM reconstitution. 
Constant is the overall effect of all the omitted categories (England, nineteenth century, nation, 
city, journal article, AFM reconstitution). 
Sources: The 365 research studies in historical demography (see the text and the Online 
Appendix). 
 
ages than national or regional ones, and that big cities reported  
higher marriage ages than small towns but lower ones than villages. 
Reassuringly, however, unpublished findings on female marriage age 
were not significantly different from published ones, journal articles 
were no different from other publications, and family reconstitutions of  
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vital registers did not yield marriage ages significantly different from 
applying Hajnal’s SMAM method to censuses.  
 Controlling for all these study characteristics, there were indeed 
significant differences in marriage age across countries. These 
differences present a more complex picture than any of the “lines”  
or “zones” which Hajnal or other researchers have hitherto been in a 
position to map out. Although the country differences in Table 2 are 
broadly consistent with Hajnal’s proposition of earlier female marriage, 
on average, in eastern and southern than in western and northern 
Europe, they also reveal societies with late (sometimes extremely late) 
female marriage in Slavic Europe (such as Slovenia and Bohemia), 
societies with early marriage in the zone west of the Hajnal line (such  
as parts of France), and highly significant differences inside countries  
(for example, between northern, central, and southern regions of France, 
Spain, and Italy).  
 Most seriously for the recent literature on the EMP, the results in 
Table 2 decisively refute the idea that economically successful England 
and the Low Countries had the most “pure” or “extreme” form of  
the EMP. Table 2 lists European countries in descending order of 
compliance with the EMP according to women’s marriage age, with 
England as the omitted category. Thus, for instance, the coefficient for 
Denmark shows that its female age at first marriage was 2.36 years 
higher than England’s, controlling for time period, unit of observation, 
settlement size, publication type, and sources and methods used;  
and that this difference compared to England is significant at the  
0.01 level. As Table 2 shows, female age at first marriage in England  
was significantly lower than that of 11 countries and was not 
significantly different from 4 others, demonstrating that its marriage 
pattern was moderate rather than “extreme” by European standards.  
All 11 countries whose female marriage age significantly exceeded 
England’s industrialized later than England, and all but the Netherlands 
had slower economic growth throughout the early modern period.  
The Netherlands, with rapid economic growth at least until 1670 and 
high per capita incomes for much longer, had female marriage age 
significantly lower than much poorer Denmark and Sweden, and not 
significantly different from slow-growing Iceland, Norway, Slovenia, 
Austria, Switzerland, Scotland, Germany, and the Baltic countries. 
Among the 39 European societies listed in Table 2, some 15 complied 
with a strict definition of the EMP in the sense of having female 
marriage age over c. 25 years (Fauve-Chamoux 2001, pp. 224–25).  
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Among these countries, the extremes of late female marriage age are  
dominated by Scandinavia, Scotland, and central and eastern-central 
Europe (Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Slovenia), not by England or 
the Netherlands. 
 The analysis of female lifetime celibacy in Table 3 likewise finds  
that England and the Netherlands displayed a moderate rather than  
an extreme manifestation of the EMP. Again, the results demonstrate  
the importance of controlling for change over time, since celibacy was 
significantly lower in the seventeenth century than during any other  
part of the early modern period. Few study characteristics significantly 
affected the findings, though observations where date was approximated 
(fortunately less than 5 percent of the total) or which were derived 
from secondary sources (21 percent of the total) had significantly 
lower celibacy rates, while those giving no methods or sources had 
significantly higher ones.  
 Controlling for study characteristics and time period, we find 
differences across European societies which are statistically significant, 
but not consistent either with Hajnal’s original division of Europe  
into discrete “zones” or with claims in the new literature that the  
most extreme values of female lifetime celibacy and thus the strongest 
manifestations of the EMP were to be found in the most economically 
successful societies. Counter to Hajnal’s conjecture, high female 
lifetime celibacy (over c. 10–15 percent) can be observed not just  
in western Europe but also in several societies in the supposedly 
universally marrying Mediterranean (Malta, Portugal, Spain) and 
Slavic Europe (Bohemia). There were also significant differences in 
female celibacy inside particular countries (for example, Spain and 
France). Most seriously for the recent literature on the EMP, Table 3 
shows that female lifetime celibacy in England was significantly lower 
than that of 11 European countries and not significantly different from 
15 others. Again, England’s marriage pattern was moderate rather than 
“extreme” by European standards. All 11 countries with significantly 
higher female celibacy industrialized later than England, as did the 15 
from which its celibacy rate did not significantly differ. Female celibacy 
in the Netherlands was lower than in 12 European societies and not 
significantly different from at least as many others. Among the 37 
European societies analyzed in Table 3, the extremes of female celibacy 
are found not in England and the Netherlands but in Scandinavia, 
Scotland, and central and eastern-central Europe (Austria, Switzerland, 
Bohemia), as well as two Latin countries, Portugal and Malta.   
 The European Marriage Pattern 665 
  
  
TABLE 3 
FEMALE LIFETIME CELIBACY: REGRESSION RESULTS 
(omitted country is England) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Country   
Austria 18.33 1.75*** 
Iceland 14.03 3.76*** 
Portugal 10.48 1.75*** 
Malta 9.51 3.07*** 
Scotland 8.73 1.33*** 
Belgium 7.74 1.88*** 
Switzerland 7.16 2.18*** 
Norway 5.32 1.71*** 
Bohemia 4.92 1.50*** 
Ireland 3.86 1.40*** 
Finland 3.83 6.34 
Baltics 3.03 2.06 
Sweden 2.70 1.36** 
Italy (all) 0.68 3.03 
Italy (southern) 0.13 1.57 
Spain (all) –0.34 2.25 
France (southern) –0.42 1.47 
Italy (northern) –0.47 1.54 
France (all) –0.47 1.27 
Germany –0.66 1.31 
France (northern) –1.66 1.34 
Denmark –1.74 2.22 
Spain (southern) –2.21 1.83 
Netherlands –2.24 1.93 
France (central) –2.48 1.84 
Russia –2.53 1.75 
Spain (northern) –2.89 1.46** 
Spain (central) –5.41 1.86*** 
Poland –7.00 2.20*** 
Croatia –7.20 6.45 
Ukraine –7.20 6.45 
Greece –7.31 2.65*** 
Hungary –8.12 2.45*** 
Romania –8.30 3.80** 
Serbia –11.19 3.02*** 
Slovenia –12.12 6.38* 
Bulgaria –12.57 2.63*** 
Century   
Sixteenth century –2.14 1.74 
Seventeenth century –4.97 0.90*** 
Eighteenth century –0.68 0.59 
Date approximate –3.04 1.21** 
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TABLE 3 — continued 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Unit of observation   
Region 0.26 0.83 
Group 1.71 1.66 
Community –0.79 1.17 
Rural or urban   
Small town –0.15 1.08 
Village/rural –1.74 0.90* 
Mixed rural/urban –1.77 1.06* 
Publication type   
Monograph –0.73 0.77 
Working paper –0.81 1.79 
Volume chapter –1.41 1.12 
Secondary source –1.79 0.58*** 
Sources and methods   
Celibacy census –0.96 0.72 
Celibacy other –1.64 1.21 
Celibacy unknown method 3.97 1.61** 
Constant 15.69 1.66*** 
* Significant at the 0.10 level.  
** Significant at the 0.05 level.  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Notes: N = 1,172. Adj. R2 = 0.3629. Variable definitions: See Table 1. Omitted categories as for 
Table 2, except for sources and methods, where omitted category is celibacy deaths. Constant is 
the overall effect of all the omitted categories (England, nineteenth century, nation, city, journal 
article, celibacy deaths). 
Sources: The 365 research studies in historical demography (see the text and the Online 
Appendix). 
 
 The recent literature also portrays a third feature of the EMP—the 
predominance of nuclear families—as explaining Europe’s economic 
success compared to the rest of the world. According to one version of 
this view, by the late medieval period, “[l]arge kinship groups remained 
only on Europe’s social and geographical margins (e.g., Scotland)” 
(Greif and Tabellini 2010, p. 137). Other variants argue that it was 
specifically the “North Sea area” (the Low Countries and England) 
where an unusually “pure” form of the EMP caused an extreme 
prevalence of neolocal marriages and nuclear families, which in turn 
generated corporative welfare and insurance institutions that benefited 
economic growth (De Moor and Van Zanden 2010, pp. 23–25).  
 The first view, according to which extended families and large 
kinship organizations were absent from Europe after the medieval 
period except on the social and geographical periphery, is decisively 
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refuted by our 911 observations of household complexity covering  
34 European societies. The unconditional averages in Table 1 already 
show that complex households containing kin outside the nuclear family 
were quite uncommon (below c. 20 percent of the total) in a wide 
variety of early modern societies, including southern Spain, Greece, 
Bohemia, Denmark, Germany, northern France, and England, but quite 
widespread (above c. 40 percent of the total) in societies as various  
as central France, Finland, the Baltic countries, Hungary, and Russia.  
The multivariate analysis in Table 4 confirms this extremely wide range 
of variation, even controlling for time period and study characteristics. 
The societies on the margins of Europe were not the ones in which high 
kin complexity survived into the early modern period: geographically 
peripheral Scandinavia, Bohemia, Greece, and southern Spain had 
unusually low levels of kin complexity by European standards, and 
peripheral Scotland had very moderate kin complexity. Northern Italy, 
by contrast, was one of the most successful European economies in the 
late medieval period, with estimated per capita GDP higher than 
England’s in 1600 and still almost equal to England’s in 1700; at the 
same time, it had one of the highest levels of household kin complexity 
in Europe (as shown in Table 4), as well as early female marriage and 
low celibacy (as shown in Tables 2–3).5 Counter to the recent literature, 
therefore, complex-family households survived in a considerable 
number of European societies after the medieval period, including in 
core regions such as central France and prosperous northern Italy. 
Conversely, low kin complexity could also be observed across  
early modern Europe in a wide variety of societies, many of them 
characterized by low per capita GDP, slow economic growth, and late 
industrialization. 
 Our data on the kin complexity of European households also refute 
the second claim in the recent literature, namely that the nuclear family 
component of the EMP took its purest manifestation in economically 
successful England and the Low Countries. Among the 34 societies 
compared in Table 4, there was a large group of 15 whose levels 
of household complexity were not significantly different from one 
another. This group included England, the Netherlands and Belgium, 
but also encompassed southern Spain, Denmark, Germany, northern 
France, Bohemia, Switzerland, Norway, Austria, Sweden, Greece, 
Iceland, Portugal and Scotland. These findings, based on over nine 
hundred observations of kin complexity over a period of four  
 
  
5 Per capita GDP measured in 1990$ was 1,100 in Italy and 974 in England in 1600; it was 1,100 in  
Italy and 1,144 in England in 1700. Available online at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/ 
vertical-file_02-2010.xls. 
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TABLE 4 
HOUSEHOLD COMPLEXITY: REGRESSION RESULTS 
(omitted country is England) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Country   
Spain (southern) –4.35 6.86 
Belgium –1.74 6.34 
Denmark 1.28 5.01 
Germany 1.57 3.58 
France (northern) 4.09 3.75 
Bohemia 4.19 5.56 
Netherlands 4.35 3.53 
Switzerland 4.92 4.39 
Norway 5.65 4.15 
Austria 5.77 3.48* 
Sweden 5.93 3.25* 
Greece 6.23 4.69 
Spain (northern) 7.68 3.20** 
Iceland 7.91 4.45* 
Ireland 9.52 4.34** 
Portugal 9.83 8.58 
Scotland 11.20 6.30* 
Poland 11.31 3.43*** 
France (southern) 11.94 3.50*** 
Italy (southern) 11.96 3.13*** 
Slovenia 16.21 5.64*** 
Spain (central) 17.24 6.31*** 
Italy (northern) 20.98 2.87*** 
Bulgaria 23.78 5.41*** 
Finland 26.46 3.27*** 
France (central) 28.26 7.02*** 
Baltics 30.59 2.65*** 
Slovakia 31.09 10.47*** 
Ukraine 33.95 10.87*** 
Hungary 34.76 3.21*** 
Serbia 35.98 7.69*** 
Russia 43.41 2.83*** 
Belarus 48.95 10.95*** 
Croatia 48.98 6.86*** 
Century   
Sixteenth century –4.38 3.61 
Seventeenth century –7.23 2.16*** 
Eighteenth century –2.13 1.24* 
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TABLE 4 — continued 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Unit of observation   
Region –10.82 9.13 
Group –13.90 9.23 
Community –12.84 9.24 
Rural or urban   
Small town 2.92 2.34 
Village/rural 10.57 1.92*** 
Mixed rural/urban 1.57 3.68 
Publication type   
Monograph –3.24 2.41 
Working paper –2.51 3.48 
Volume chapter 2.59 2.05 
Secondary source –1.62 1.51 
Constant 20.18 9.42** 
* Significant at the 0.10 level.  
** Significant at the 0.05 level.  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Notes: N = 911. Adj. R2 = 0.5217. Variable definitions: See Table 1. Omitted categories as in 
Table 2. No omitted category for sources and methods. Constant is the overall effect of all the 
omitted categories (England, nineteenth century, nation, city, journal article). 
Sources: The 365 research studies in historical demography (see the text and the Online 
Appendix). 
 
centuries, do not support the idea that the distinctive economic success 
enjoyed by England and the Netherlands can be ascribed to their 
having a particularly “pure” manifestation of the predominance of 
nuclear families under the EMP.  
 Table 4 also reaffirms the importance of examining change over  
time, not just differences among countries. Hypothesis testing of  
the coefficients on the century variables shows that controlling for  
other variables in the regression, European household complexity rose 
significantly between the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, and 
rose again, with marginal statistical significance, between the eighteenth 
and the nineteenth. Contrary to the idea that a more accentuated 
compliance with the EMP was associated with growth of the economy, 
the 34 European societies represented in Table 4 were moving further 
away from extreme compliance with the EMP as their economies grew 
across the early modern period. 
 Table 5 presents the results of a Borda ranking of the 33 European 
societies which appear in all three of Tables 2–4. Societies are  
ranked according to the three EMP criteria—female marriage age,  
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TABLE 5 
BORDA RANKING OF COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO EXTREMENESS OF EUROPEAN 
MARRIAGE PATTERN 
Country
Female 
Marriage
Age Rank 
Female 
Celibacy
Rank
Household
Complexity 
Rank
Combined
Score
Borda
Rank
Belgium 7 5 2 14 1 
Austria 6 1 11 18 2 
Iceland 2 2 15 19 3 
Norway 4 7 10 21 4 
Denmark 1 19 4 24 5 
Switzerland 9 6 9 24 5 
Sweden 5 12 12 29 7 
Bohemia 15 8 7 30 8 
England 13 14 3 30 8 
Scotland 10 4 18 32 10 
Germany 11 17 5 33 11 
France (northern) 12 18 6 36 12 
Portugal 16 3 17 36 12 
Netherlands 8 21 8 37 14 
Ireland 21 9 16 46 15 
Spain (southern) 26 20 1 47 16 
Baltics 14 11 28 53 17 
Finland 17 10 26 53 17 
France (southern) 20 15 20 55 19 
Slovenia 3 32 22 57 20 
Spain (northern) 19 24 14 57 20 
Italy (southern) 25 13 21 59 22 
Italy (northern) 22 16 24 62 23 
France (central) 18 22 27 67 24 
Greece 27 29 13 69 25 
Poland 24 26 19 69 25 
Spain (central) 23 25 23 71 27 
Russia 29 23 32 84 28 
Ukraine 30 28 29 87 29 
Hungary 28 30 30 88 30 
Bulgaria 33 33 25 91 31 
Croatia 31 27 33 91 31 
Serbia 32 31 31 94 33 
Notes: Ranking is based on the coefficients in Tables 2–4; since hypothesis-testing showed that 
countries do not fall into discrete sets, the value of the estimated coefficient is used, regardless 
of whether it is statistically significantly different from adjacent coefficients. Ranking covers all 
countries in the data set for which there are observations on all three measures of the European 
Marriage Pattern (female marriage age, female lifetime celibacy, and household structure).
Sources: The 365 research studies in historical demography (see the text and the Online 
Appendix).  
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female celibacy, and household complexity—based on the coefficients 
on the relevant country variables in Tables 2–4.6 The first finding  
to emerge from Table 5 is that strong manifestations of the three 
components of the EMP were not invariably associated with one 
another. The Spearman correlation coefficients between the marriage 
age rank and the two other ranks were both 0.61, and only 0.45 between 
the celibacy and the household structure rank. No country topped the 
ranking on more than one criterion out of the three.  
 The combined Borda ranking in column 6 provides a clear 
confirmation that the economic success stories, England and the 
Netherlands, had moderate rather than extreme demographic patterns. 
Among the 33 societies in Table 5, England lay about one-quarter 
of the way down the ranking, and the Netherlands two-fifths of the way.  
Although the imperfect correlation among the three demographic 
benchmarks militates against unambiguous categorizations, the first 15 
societies in the Table 5 ranking would be generally accepted as ones  
in which the EMP prevailed. Among these 15 societies manifesting  
the EMP, England lay squarely in the middle, sharing 8th position with 
Bohemia, a poor and slow-growing eastern-central European economy 
which was subject to the “second serfdom” until the late eighteenth 
century.7 The Netherlands, whose economic success exceeded that of  
all other European countries save England, lay at rank 14, and thus 
towards the bottom of the 15 societies in Table 5 that manifested  
the EMP. Whatever definition of “pure” or “extreme” one adopts for  
the EMP, England and the Netherlands do not meet it. The extreme 
manifestations of the EMP were found in the German-speaking lands 
and Scandinavia, which experienced slow early modern growth 
and relatively late industrialization.  
 The historical demographic data, then, fail to support central 
empirical claims advanced in the recent EMP literature. Counter to the 
idea that the EMP explains the “Great Divergence” between Europe and 
the rest of the world, late marriage, high celibacy, and nuclear families 
were not universal within “Europe.” In core areas, including central 
France and northern Italy, women married early and universally, and 
extended families were widespread. In industrializing England during 
its fastest economic growth, demographic patterns moved further away 
from the EMP as marriage ages fell and household complexity rose 
  
6 On Borda ranking of countries according to development indicators, see Dasgupta (1993,  
pp. 108–16). 
7 On pre-Emancipation Bohemia, see Ogilvie 2001; Klein and Ogilvie 2013. After serf 
emancipation in 1781, the Bohemian economy grew much faster, by 1820 attaining  
estimated per capital GDP of 1990$849, less than half that of England, and only just over  
the estimated 1990$819 for Sweden, the poorest country in Figure 1; available online 
at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/ vertical-file_02-2010.xls. 
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(Anderson 1971; Wrigley and Schofield 1981). Late marriage, high 
celibacy, and nuclear families are therefore not plausible explanations 
for the Great Divergence. Nor do the data support using the EMP  
to explain English and Dutch economic primacy. Late marriage,  
high celibacy, and low kin complexity characterized huge swathes  
of Europe, extending even to societies under the second serfdom.  
Far from being extreme cases of the EMP, England and the Netherlands 
manifested moderate demographic patterns. The extremes were 
found in Scandinavian and central European economies which were 
much poorer and grew more slowly. Early modern Europe, it appears, 
had a number of different marriage patterns. The empirical regularity of 
late marriage, high celibacy, and low kin complexity which Hajnal 
called the EMP was not monolithic, but rather was subject to  
many gradations along its different components in different societies. 
Moreover, this demographic pattern was compatible with a wide range 
of economic and institutional outcomes. 
 We turn now to the causal mechanisms through which the EMP is 
supposed to have bolstered economic development. Examining these 
mechanisms can help us better understand why scholars have posited a 
causal relationship between the EMP and economic success. Moreover, 
the qualitative evidence and other analytical approaches used to 
construct these causal accounts may reveal better empirical support for 
them. Furthermore, investigating the causal mechanisms involved can 
shed light on the endogeneity problems raised by the EMP literature, 
making clearer the ways in which demographic decisions are taken 
simultaneously with other economic and social choices.  
 
Women’s Position 
 
 A first causal mechanism adduced in the recent literature  
places women’s economic position at center stage. England and the 
Netherlands grew more rapidly, it is argued, because their strong 
versions of the EMP weakened patriarchal authority over daughters, 
reduced son preference, improved women’s property rights, encouraged 
female labor force participation, empowered widows, and created 
spousal equality, all of which fuelled economic growth (De Moor and 
Van Zanden 2010). In other variants, women’s superior position under 
the EMP made fertility responsive to economic signals, ensuring capital 
accumulation which in turn caused growth (Voigtlander and Voth 2006, 
2013). In still other versions, women’s superior position under the  
EMP increased human capital investment and fuelled subsequent 
growth (Foreman-Peck 2011).  
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 This raises the issue of endogeneity. On the one hand, the EMP is 
supposed to have created a better economic position for women. But on 
the other, greater female autonomy is supposed to have given rise 
to the EMP. Moreover, both marriage patterns and women’s position 
are ascribed to underlying factors such as cultural attitudes, the Black 
Death, and pastoral agriculture. Among these, only the Black Death can 
be regarded as a plausibly exogenous factor. Yet even this assumption  
is weakened by the fact that the occurrence of plague was influenced  
by underlying demographic and economic conditions, including 
urbanization, agricultural performance, nutritional status, warfare, and 
long-distance trade (Brenner 1976, 1982; Pamuk 2007). Furthermore, 
the causal influence of the Black Death in the context of the EMP is 
questionable, since the epidemic raged throughout Europe and the 
Near East, but was followed by very different patterns of marriage, 
gender relations, and economic growth in different societies, which can 
in turn be traced back to preexisting social and institutional differences 
(Brenner 1976, 1982; Pamuk 2007). The evident endogeneity of the 
different variables limits the scope of these claims to the merely 
descriptive assertion that the EMP was associated with a higher status 
for women, with concomitant economic benefits. 
 Moreover, even this assertion is at odds with the evidence.  
The women’s history literature suggests that women had a relatively 
good economic position in some societies with the EMP and a 
comparatively bad one in others. England and the Netherlands are 
certainly regarded as having endowed women with a favorable 
economic position compared to other European societies (for overviews 
of a vast literature, see Laurence 1994; Prior 1994; Dekker 1998;  
De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, pp. 598–601; Ogilvie 2003, pp. 
344–51). But England and the Netherlands were also distinctive in their 
per capita incomes (as Figure 1 shows) and many other respects: 
their factor prices, resource endowments, geopolitical position, trade 
participation, parliaments, legal systems, financial arrangements, 
and early liberalization of manorial, communal, and corporative 
institutions, have all been adduced as causes of their early economic 
success (for recent contributions, see Allen 2009; Mokyr 2009; 
McCloskey 2010; De Vries and Van der Woude 1997; Van Zanden and 
Van Leeuwen 2012). The long-running discussion about what caused 
English and Dutch distinctiveness, whether in economic growth or 
gender issues, cannot be simplified away by invoking a feature such  
as the EMP which, as we have seen, England and the Netherlands 
shared with many other societies in western, Nordic, central, and 
eastern-central Europe whose economies grew slowly and industrialized 
late.  
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 Outside these two precociously advanced market economies,  
women had a much worse economic position. In Germany, Scandinavia, 
France, and many other regions, as historians of crafts and commerce  
have found, the EMP prevailed but women’s participation in many 
occupations was significantly restricted by guilds of craftsmen, retailers, 
and merchants (Manninen 1984; Wiesner 1986, 1989, 2000; Collins 
1989; Coffin 1994; Ogilvie 1997, 2003, 2004, 2010; Hafter 2007;  
Lanza 2007). Yet these are the precise corporative institutions which 
some of the new literature regards as a beneficial offshoot of the  
EMP (Greif 2006; De Moor and Van Zanden 2010). In many regions of 
Switzerland, Germany, and France, as local studies indicate, the EMP 
prevailed but women’s work, wages, property rights, and in some cases 
even their consumption choices, were restricted by local communities 
—again, by corporative institutions (Ogilvie 1997, 2003, 2004, 2010;  
Dürr 1995; Ryter 1997; Hafter 2007; Ulbrich 1999). Among servants 
and laborers, the female-male wage ratio lay between 0.6 and 0.7  
in early modern England and the Netherlands, but was as low as  
0.4 in regions of Germany where wage ceilings and employment 
restrictions were enforced against women workers—again, by guilds 
and local communities (Ogilvie 2003, 2004; Van Zanden 2011).  
In the Netherlands, self-employed spinners earned competitive  
piece-rates high enough to attract even male workers (Van Nederveen 
Meerkerk 2010), but in the German territory of Württemberg, where  
an extreme form of the EMP prevailed (Guinnane and Ogilvie 2014), 
guilds allied with community institutions to cap spinners’ rates, pushing 
them to the subsistence margins; among men, only the handicapped 
worked as spinners (Ogilvie 1997, 2003, 2004). In Bohemia, where the 
EMP was as “pure” as in England, female household headship was low, 
girls could not inherit, and serf communes collaborated with landlords 
to harass economically independent women (Ogilvie and Edwards 
2000).  
 Whether women enjoyed economic autonomy under any 
demographic system depended on the balance of power among other 
institutions. Strong guilds that excluded women from formal training 
and employment existed both in northern Italy (in the absence of  
the EMP) and in Germany (in its presence). Weaker guilds imposing 
looser constraints on women’s work existed both in eastern Europe  
(in the absence of the EMP) and in England and the Netherlands  
(in its presence) (Ogilvie 2003). Village communities that limited 
female autonomy were strong in both Russia (outside the EMP) and 
Germany or Bohemia (where the EMP prevailed) (Ogilvie 1997, 2003, 
2004, 2010; Dennison and Ogilvie 2007; Dennison 2011). Corporative 
institutions played a central role in constraining women’s economic 
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activities, but show no systematic relationship with the EMP, counter  
to the recent literature. Where such institutions were strong, the mere 
prevalence of the EMP did not guarantee female autonomy. 
 There were also societies where the EMP did not prevail, but 
indicators of female autonomy reached similar levels to those where  
it did. The female household headship rate, for instance, is one of the 
few available quantitative indicators of female autonomy in premodern 
societies. Female headship of 10–15 percent was typical of early 
modern western Europe, where it was often quantitatively associated 
with other measures of women’s economic autonomy (Ogilvie and 
Edwards 2000; Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie 2013). But non-EMP 
societies could also have high female headship, together with large 
numbers of female laborers and servants, as shown by parts of 
nineteenth-century Russia (Dennison 2011, pp. 78–79, 160–71).  
As such findings indicate, women supported households and 
participated in the labor force under many different demographic 
systems. What mattered for female autonomy and any resulting 
economic benefits was not solely marriage or household patterns,  
but what kinds of work women were allowed to do and what wages  
they were allowed to earn. These in turn were strongly influenced 
by nonfamilial institutions—communes, guilds, manorial systems, the 
church, the state—which regulated women’s economic options. 
 European women’s economic position fluctuated significantly across 
time, even while the EMP remained relatively stable. In agriculture,  
for instance, changes in technology, farm size, labor demand, and rural 
institutions reduced Dutch and English women’s wages between the 
sixteenth and the eighteenth century—precisely the period when the 
EMP is supposed to have fuelled Dutch and English economic success 
(Snell 1981; Burnette 2008; Langdon 2010; Van Zanden 2011).  
In industry and commerce, guilds intensified restrictions on women’s 
activities between the late Middle Ages and the eighteenth century in 
many European societies; the EMP provided no protection against this 
intensification, which depended rather on the balance of power between 
guilds and other institutions in different societies (Wiesner 1989, 2000; 
Bennett 1993; Ogilvie 2003, 2004, 2010; Van Nederveen Meerkerk 
2006, 2010; Van den Heuvel 2007; Ogilvie, Küpker, and Maegraith 
2011). 
 Available evidence does not support the idea that women’s status was 
determined exogenously by the household formation system, whether 
the EMP or any other. Rather, women decided when and whether  
to marry jointly with their other economic options. These options were 
strongly influenced by nonfamilial institutions constraining female 
labor force participation, earnings, property rights, market access, 
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consumption, and legal autonomy.8 Such institutions were often 
manipulated in favor of male insiders, but to differing degrees  
in different societies—regardless of whether the EMP prevailed.  
Female empowerment indeed typically benefits economic development.  
But there is little evidence that female empowerment in early modern 
Europe was primarily influenced by the marriage system rather than by 
wider social and institutional constraints. 
 
Human Capital Investment 
 
 Human capital investment is a second mechanism by which the  
EMP is supposed to have caused European economic growth. In one 
version, the EMP led to more schooling, apprenticeship, servant 
training, literacy, numeracy, and gender parity in education; in turn, 
“the comparatively high investment in human capital formation in the 
North Sea area in this period formed the necessary basis for the rapid 
growth of its economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”  
(De Moor and Van Zanden 2010, p. 23). Another variant argues that 
nineteenth-century western European economic growth is explained 
by the emergence of the EMP after the Black Death, 600 years earlier: 
“the lower time cost and general price of investing in ‘child quality’ of 
better informed mothers stimulated investment in human capital, which 
in turn eventually raised outputs and incomes” (Foreman-Peck 2011,  
p. 293). Still other versions contend that Europe developed faster than 
China after the ninth century because the European nuclear family 
fostered corporative institutions such as guilds, cities, and universities, 
which created and diffused knowledge (Greif 2006; Greif and Tabellini 
2012). 
 A first issue raised by these arguments concerns the logic behind 
families’ investment in education. Parents will invest in their offspring’s 
education (as opposed to buying it as a consumption good) if such 
investment promises a positive return. This incentive can work in two 
ways. First, parents may expect to share returns from their offspring’s 
education via transfers from the offspring in adulthood. But this runs 
counter to a basic feature of the EMP, that net intergenerational wealth 
flow runs from parents to children: offspring leave home early, form 
independent households on marriage, often emigrate, and seldom remit 
earnings (Caldwell 1976). A family system with these characteristics 
creates disincentives to invest in offspring’s human capital since parents 
cannot expect to share the returns.  
  
8 For a more general analysis of the role played by nonfamilial institutions in influencing 
women’s economic position, see Ogilvie and Edwards (2000); Ogilvie (2003, esp. chap. 7; 
2004). 
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 Second, altruism may motivate parents to invest in their offspring’s 
education: the offspring’s expected future well-being increases parents’ 
own well-being. But this incentive depends on whether occupations 
requiring education and training are open to offspring. Parents will invest 
in daughters’ education (as opposed to buying it as a consumption good) 
if females are allowed to do work that requires skills, instead of being 
institutionally excluded from such occupations. Even to motivate sons’ 
education, skilled occupations must be open to all capable entrants. But 
access to skilled occupations in preindustrial Europe did not depend on 
the marriage system, whether the EMP or any other. Rather, it depended 
on institutions regulating labor markets: craft guilds, merchant 
associations, urban privileges, village communities, and serfdom. As 
discussed earlier, women were institutionally permitted to practice skilled 
occupations (such as crafts and commerce) only in some societies with 
the EMP, specifically the Netherlands and England, and even there guilds 
often restricted female work (Van den Heuvel 2007; Van Nederveen 
Meerkerk 2010; Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie 2013). In other EMP 
societies, such as Germany, Scandinavia, and France, guilds excluded 
many females (and “outsider” males) from skilled crafts and trades. This 
reduced incentives to invest in daughters’ education, although better-off 
parents still purchased it as a consumption good. The EMP by itself 
cannot have been crucial in creating incentives for female education since 
the EMP existed, as we have seen, both in societies where skilled 
occupations were comparatively open to women and in those where 
coercive institutions excluded them more thoroughly. What decided 
whether women learned vocational skills were barriers to entry imposed 
by corporative institutions seeking economic rents for insiders by 
restricting low-cost competitors.  
 A deeper issue is the endogeneity of all the variables. On the one hand, 
the EMP is supposed to have caused high human capital investment: this 
is central to the argument that the EMP contributed to growth. But on the 
other, the rewards provided by high English and Dutch wages are 
supposed to have motivated workers to invest in skills, thereby increasing 
marriage ages and celibacy rates. Underlying variables—European 
culture, the Black Death, pastoral specialization—are also adduced as 
causes of both the EMP and human capital investment. Once again, the 
Black Death emerges as the only arguably exogenous variable, and yet 
both its exogeneity and its causal influence on the EMP seem doubtful 
given its divergent occurrence and impact in different societies (Brenner 
1976, 1982; Pamuk 2007). The endogeneity of all variables again reduces 
the scope of the claims simply to the descriptive assertion that the EMP 
was associated with higher human capital investment, which in turn 
caused economic growth.  
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TABLE 6 
HUMAN CAPITAL LEVELS IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES BEFORE AND DURING 
INDUSTRIALIZATION 
Country
Primary 
Enrollment Literacy Numeracy 
 
1830 1840 1850 
1800 
Male 
1800 
Female 1700 1750 1800 
England 274 351 498 60 40 93 93 93 
Netherlands   541 73 51   98 
Belgium 346 526 549 60 37 72  98 
Germany: Protestant      87 96 88 
Germany: Catholic      68 86  
Germany: Prussia 695 714 730      
Germany: Saxony    80 44    
Germany: Hesse    91 43    
Denmark      90 96 100 
France (all) 388 513 515 48 27 89 93 96 
France (northern)    71 44    
Norway 685 671 640    93 96 
Poland       94 91 
Switzerland      66  98 
Austria  367 389   81 86 96 
Bohemia       85 85 84 
Scotland   592 65 15    
Ireland        77 
Italy (all) 28  124      
Italy (northern)       89 87 
Notes: School enrollment: pupils enrolled in primary schools, per 1,000 children aged 5–14. 
Literacy: percent of adults who could sign their name.  
Numeracy: estimates based on age-heaping in census-type listings.  
England = England and Wales for primary enrollment; UK for numeracy. 
Sources: School enrollment: Lindert (2004, pp. 91–92, table 5.1).  
Numeracy: A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2009). 
Literacy: Reis (2005, p. 203, table 8.2). 
 
 But the descriptive assertion itself is problematic. Table 6 presents 
human capital indicators for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Europe. These show that education levels varied hugely across EMP 
societies. This is not surprising, since the family was not the only, or the 
main, institution affecting education. Schooling, literacy, and numeracy 
were strongly influenced by other institutions: market, church, 
state, community, and guild. This wider institutional framework varied 
substantially across EMP societies. In some, such as Germany  
and Scandinavia, the church allied with the state and local communities 
to enforce compulsory schooling, leading to the high literacy and  
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enrollment levels shown in Table 6. In other EMP societies, such  
as England, these institutional pressures were weaker, resulting in  
much lower schooling and literacy. Numeracy was typically learned 
informally in response to market demand, explaining why England, 
with its mediocre enrollment and literacy rates, had numeracy similar  
to more institutionally regulated societies such as Germany or 
Scandinavia.  
 Nor is it clear that human capital investment caused European 
economic growth before and during industrialization. As Figure 1 
shows, England experienced rapid economic growth in the early modern 
period; it industrialized before any other society. Yet schooling and 
literacy stagnated there during the “long eighteenth century” and were 
not high by European standards until well into the nineteenth. Economic 
historians who differ on other explanatory issues concur that education 
played hardly any role in English industrialization (Mokyr 2009;  
Allen 2009; McCloskey 2010). In 1800 literacy for both sexes in 
England was lower than in the German states of Hesse and Saxony,  
the Netherlands, and northern France, much slower-growing economies; 
male literacy was lower in England than in Scotland (Reis 2005, table 
8.2). In 1830–1850 school enrollment was lower in England than in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Prussia, Norway, or Scotland, all much 
slower-growing economies (Lindert 2004, table 5.1). In numeracy, 
England’s relative disadvantage was less pronounced, but in 1750  
it lay below that in Denmark, Protestant Germany, and even Poland;  
in 1800 it was still lower than that of many poorer and slower- 
growing economies, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland (A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen 
2009, table 4).  As these figures show, many European societies with 
high educational levels had slow economic growth. The Netherlands 
had high enrollment, literacy, and numeracy, but after the end of its 
seventeenth-century Golden Age its economy stagnated (as Figure 1 
illustrates), and it industrialized late.9 German territories had higher 
enrollment and literacy than England or the Low Countries, but 
stagnated throughout the early modern period and did not industrialize 
until after c. 1840. A similar pattern is found in Scandinavia, with high 
enrollment and literacy, but slow growth and late industrialization 
(Skovgaard-Peterson 1990; Johansson 2009). 
  
9 On Dutch economic stagnation after the Golden Age, see De Vries and Van der Woude 
(1997); Van Zanden and Van Riel (2004). Van Zanden and Van Leeuwen (2012) present  
new estimates suggesting that the province of Holland experienced stagnation rather than  
actual decline between c. 1670 and c. 1800, but their figures refer solely to Holland, by far the  
most economically successful province. Even for Holland, industry had a near-zero growth rate 
between 1665 and 1800 and trade contracted at a rate of 0.13 percent p.a. between 1720 and 
1800 (Table 4). 
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 Education levels thus varied greatly among EMP countries in a way 
that was not correlated with their economic performance in the early 
modern period. Nonetheless, it might be argued that there must have 
been some relationship between the three variables because education 
and income levels were, on average, higher in societies with the EMP 
than in those with “Mediterranean” or “Slavic” marriage patterns. But 
southern and eastern Europe differed from north-western Europe not 
just in their marriage patterns but also in many other economic,  
social, and institutional characteristics which affect both education and 
growth. Furthermore, as economic theory recognizes, one reason it is 
difficult to establish that education causes growth is endogeneity: 
improving education may increase incomes, but rising incomes increase 
consumption of education as a normal good. Regardless of the reasons 
for greater prosperity in northwest Europe, one would expect to see 
people there consuming (as opposed to investing in) more education.  
 In many early modern European societies, educational investments 
were imposed by coercive institutions to serve elite interests rather  
than being chosen by ordinary people to improve their own or their 
children’s economic productivity. It is therefore unsurprising that  
no causal relationship between demographic patterns, educational 
indicators, and economic performance emerges in Europe before the 
late nineteenth century. 
 
Demographic Responsiveness to Economic Conditions 
 
 A third way the EMP is held to have contributed to economic growth 
is its restriction of marriage to those who could establish an independent 
household. This, it is argued, was necessary for ensuring that population 
growth responded to economic conditions. In parts of the recent EMP 
literature, such demographic responsiveness to economic trends is 
regarded as contributing to growth indirectly, via its effect on the two 
mechanisms already discussed: women’s economic status (De Moor and 
Van Zanden 2011, pp. 18, 27) and human capital investment (Foreman-
Peck 2011, pp. 293, 299–301). But other parts of the new literature 
portray demographic responsiveness as a primary and direct cause of 
economic growth, by ensuring capital accumulation: population growth 
slowed when the economy was doing poorly, ensuring that per capita 
incomes were high enough for capital accumulation to continue, but 
accelerated when the economy did well, generating more savers whose 
larger aggregate capital accumulation created positive externalities for 
growth via technological innovation. According to this view, England’s 
“extreme” form of the EMP gave it two key advantages over other 
countries in accumulating capital. Before 1700, it is claimed, England 
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started with a “better” demographic regime, resulting in higher initial 
incomes and larger initial capital externalities. Then after 1700 English 
population growth responded more sensitively to economic trends, 
guaranteeing continual capital accumulation with concomitant growth 
externalities (Voigtländer and Voth 2006).  
 But how well do these arguments hold up empirically? A first 
empirical concern is that no factual support is offered for the idea that  
it was capital accumulation that caused England’s economic success.  
This is merely maintained as a theoretical assumption, without reference  
to the literature on English economic growth, which does not assign 
capital accumulation an important role (Mokyr 2009; Allen 2009; 
McCloskey 2010).  
 A second issue is the elision between England and Europe. 
Voigtländer and Voth, for instance, present simulations showing that  
if England had had high and economically unresponsive population 
growth (as they assume China’s to have been), its economy would have 
collapsed. This, they contend, “underlines the crucial importance 
of fertility limitation as part of Europe’s unique demographic regime” 
(Voigtländer and Voth 2006, p. 346). But “Europe” did not have a 
unique demographic regime, as Tables 2–4 show. Rather, it had a 
multiplicity of different regimes. Some of these involved early female 
marriage, low female celibacy, and high household complexity, similar 
to what is known of preindustrial Chinese demography (Lee and Feng 
1999; Caldwell 2001). Since the EMP did not prevail all over Europe, 
any argument concerning possible demographic influences on economic 
divergence between Europe and China must refer to marriage patterns 
in a carefully differentiated way.  
 In tacit acknowledgement that Europe did not have a monolithic 
demographic regime that distinguished it from China, Voigtländer  
and Voth assert that the growth benefits of the European demographic 
regime were limited to England, because it had an “extreme form” of 
the EMP; nearby France lacked this regime, they claim, which is why 
its economy fell behind (Voigtländer and Voth 2006, pp. 323, 343–45). 
But the simulations purporting to demonstrate this conclusion rely on 
two unsupported assumptions about demographic differences between 
England and France. 
 The first is that demographic “starting conditions” differed between 
the two countries. In England, it is argued, “the demographic regime 
propped up initial incomes” before 1700, creating greater scope  
for the capital externality to work; in France, by contrast, these  
starting conditions were lacking, so the economy grew more slowly 
(Voigtländer and Voth 2006, pp. 321–22). But no empirical support is  
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provided for the assertion that it was demography that caused incomes 
to be higher in England than France before 1700, and indeed this seems 
an open question, given the many other differences between the  
two countries in factors affecting per capita income. Nor is 
evidence provided to support the claimed difference between pre-1700  
English and French demography. Northern France manifested the 
EMP from a very early date (Perrin 1963) and did not differ 
significantly from England in marriage age, lifetime celibacy, or 
household structure across the entire early modern period (as Tables 
2–4 show). Population growth before 1700 was very moderate across all 
of France (Dupâquier 1997) and Voigtländer and Voth themselves 
assume a low initial French population growth rate of 0.32 percent p.a. 
(2006, p. 344). This makes it unlikely that a claimed difference in 
demographic regime between France and England explains the two 
countries’ gap in per capita income in 1700 which, in the simulations, 
drives much of the subsequent divergence in their growth trajectories. 
 The second demographic assumption driving divergent growth  
rates in these simulations is that fertility was constant in France  
but economically elastic in England. French population growth 
consequently failed to decelerate when the economy flagged and failed 
to accelerate when the economy flourished, precluding the virtuous 
growth circle via more capital accumulation that was guaranteed by 
demographic responsiveness in England (Voigtländer and Voth 2006,  
p. 345). But this assumption is not consistent with findings in the  
large literature on demographic responsiveness to economic signals. 
David Weir (1984) showed that “at no time between 1670 and 1830 
were marriages less responsive to economic conditions in France than  
in England.” The causes of the gap between French and English growth 
performance, he concluded, “are not to be found in difference of 
demographic behavior” (pp. 43–44). In Germany, the elasticity of 
fertility with respect to economic signals was higher than in England, 
though slightly lower than in France, throughout the eighteenth  
century (Guinnane and Ogilvie 2008). In an analysis of nine early 
modern European economies, the response of fertility to a one-
standard-deviation change in grain prices was weaker in England than 
in societies such as Austria, Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 
where economic growth was slower, or in Tuscany, where the EMP  
did not prevail (Galloway 1988). In China, where the EMP also did  
not prevail, recent studies show that eighteenth-century fertility rates 
responded to changes in grain prices (Wang, Campbell, and Lee 2010; 
Campbell and Lee 2010, pp. 107–11). For England itself, several studies 
have found that fertility became less responsive to economic signals  
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around 1750, at the precise period that the English economy began to 
grow faster and diverge most from other western European economies 
(Galloway 1988; Nicolini 2007; Crafts and Mills 2009).10  
 Demographic responsiveness to economic conditions thus did not 
depend solely on the EMP and can be observed in some societies  
in which the EMP did not prevail. It was also less extreme in England 
than in a number of slower-growing European economies. Therefore  
it makes little sense to attribute any growth gap between England  
and other economies to the EMP or the way it may have mediated 
population responses to economic signals. 
 
Cultural Norms 
 
 Many proponents of the view that the EMP explains economic 
growth maintain that it was associated with cultural norms that further 
contributed to economic success. One variant emphasizes putative 
specificities of English culture: “social and cultural norms limited 
fertility in early modern England in a way that few other societies did” 
(Voigtländer and Voth 2006, p. 323). However, these are difficult 
claims to sustain empirically. The idea that England had distinctive 
cultural norms is vigorously debated among historians, and no study  
has presented evidence that English culture gave unusual emphasis 
to fertility limitation.11  
 An older literature occasionally speculated that economic growth was 
favored by a Weberian Protestant culture that valued rational control of 
fertility (Landes 1969). Even that literature, however, was aware that 
fertility lay below the biological maximum not just in England but 
across large swathes of premodern Europe and indeed in non-European 
cultures such as Japan (Landes 1969, p. 22 n. 2). With regard to Weber, 
moreover, historical demographic research long ago demonstrated that 
the fertility-controlling practices of late marriage and high lifetime 
celibacy were widespread in Catholic as well as Protestant Europe, as 
shown by the results for Catholic Belgium, Austria, northern France, 
Bohemia, and Slovenia in Tables 2–3 above, as well as the notably high 
marriage age and celibacy in German Catholic states such as Bavaria 
(Guinnane and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 79, 110). 
 Other variants of the recent literature relate the EMP and its  
putative economic benefits to cultural norms propagated by medieval 
  
10 Kelly and Ó Gráda (2012) find stronger responsiveness of fertility to economic conditions 
in early modern England using less aggregative approaches; but this merely suggests 
that similarly disaggregated approaches would yield amplified elasticities for other preindustrial 
societies. 
11 On English cultural distinctiveness, see the lively debate about Macfarlane (1978), relating 
to “English individualism.”  
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Christianity. One account holds that in Europe by the ninth century, 
“tribal tendencies were gradually undone by the church which,  
in addition to generalized morality, advanced a marriage dogma  
that undermined large kinship organizations” (Greif and Tabellini 2010, 
p. 137). The resulting combination of nuclear families and corporative 
institutions supposedly fostered additional growth-inducing beliefs and 
norms, including “the rule of law, the legitimacy of majority rule, 
respect for minority rights, individualism, and trust among non-kin” 
(Greif 2006, p. 311). Another variant holds that the EMP and its 
economic benefits arose from, and helped to sustain, medieval Christian 
norms of consensual marriage and gender parity. Having once arisen, 
the EMP then helped sustain these norms, in contrast to less benign 
cultural norms sustained by non-European marriage patterns in eastern 
Europe or China (De Moor and Van Zanden 2010, pp. 1, 4–7; Van 
Zanden 2011, p. 333).  
 A first problem with these claims is that they provide no evidence  
on how medieval Christian dogmas were implemented in practice.  
The relevant literature, by contrast, strongly emphasizes the role played 
by social institutions other than the family and the church in the widely 
varying enforcement of medieval ecclesiastical provisions concerning 
demographic matters. Peter Biller (2001), for instance, points out  
that lay society shaped religious views on demographic issues very 
differently in different parts of medieval Europe. Lloyd Bonfield (2001) 
finds that the medieval church could only implement theologically 
inspired marriage formation rules by allying with local institutions  
and interests. Charles Donahue (1983, 2008) observes significant 
differences across medieval Western Europe in enforcement of religious 
norms about marriage, which he ascribes to differences in legal systems, 
property rights, and other institutions.  
 A second problem with linking the EMP to medieval Christian norms 
—whether of generalized morality, consensual marriage, or fertility 
control—is that marriage practices and kinship complexity varied 
enormously across Christian Europe. As Tables 2–4 illustrate, the EMP 
was not, and did not become, the prevalent family system in those  
parts of Europe where the church was strongest. Italy, for instance,  
was undisputedly and enduringly influenced by the Catholic Church 
whose seat was in Rome, yet many Italian regions had early female 
marriage, low female celibacy, and high kin complexity. In Spain, 
church regulation of marriage and sexuality had observable effects  
on nuptiality and fertility, yet church teachings were compatible with  
a “European” marriage pattern in some regions of Spain and a “non-
European” pattern in others (Pérez Moreda 1997; Reher 1998a, 1998b).  
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The same was true of Portugal, strongly Catholic, but with a mixture  
of “European” and “non-European” marriage patterns (Sonnino 1997; 
Michelotto 2011).  
 The wide variation in demographic behavior within ethnically and 
linguistically homogeneous regions casts further doubt on the idea  
that the EMP was associated with the beliefs and values of particular 
cultures. In southern Europe, historians have identified “two different 
family systems in the northern and southern regions of Iberia, and  
no less than three in Italy” (Viazzo 2003, p. 122). In the countryside 
around Bologna, sharecropping farmers lived in predominantly  
complex (“non-European”) households while their neighbors who  
were agricultural laborers lived in predominantly nuclear-family 
(“European”) households (Kertzer 2002). Within France, as Tables 2–4 
show, marriage age, celibacy, and the balance between nuclear and 
extended families differed substantially between the south and north of 
the country. Across Spain, as well, marriage patterns and household 
structure varied greatly: within the same early modern Catalan 
community, for instance, household complexity was a “European”  
15 percent among landless villagers but a “non-European” 50 percent 
among large peasant farmers (Kertzer 2002; Reher 1997). Hungary had 
regions dominated by nuclear families alongside ones where extended 
families predominated (Andorka and Faragó 1983). In Sweden, 
communities with only 10 percent complex households existed 
alongside others with 25 percent (Egherbladh 1989). European Russia, 
likewise, manifested diverse marriage patterns and family forms across 
culturally identical communities (Dennison 2011).  
 It is difficult, therefore, to find empirical support for the notion  
that the EMP was caused by, or sustained, distinctive cultural  
norms. There was no systematic relationship between the teachings  
of the church on the one hand and marriage age, lifetime celibacy,  
or household complexity on the other. The extent to which the church 
was able to implement its ideology depended on the institutional 
characteristics of each European society. Strongly religious European 
societies included those with early marriage, low celibacy, and 
extended-family households as well as those with extreme forms of the 
EMP. The widely variegated distribution of European marriage patterns, 
shown in Tables 2–4, is not consistent with any notion of a distinctive 
culture—whether of fertility control, generalized morality, or gender 
parity—let alone one that accounts for European economic growth. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The evidence presented in this article implies a new view of  
the interaction between demographic and economic decisions. That 
economists and economic historians have turned their attention to  
demographic behavior is a positive development (Guinnane 2012;  
Galor 2011; Acemoglu 2009). But recent attempts to attribute European 
economic success to the EMP cannot be sustained empirically or 
theoretically. The EMP did not prevail throughout Europe, or even 
throughout the core of Europe. The three key components of the 
EMP were not invariably associated with one another. Where  
the components of the EMP did coincide in their most “pure” form, 
economic growth was slower and industrialization later than in 
societies where the EMP took less extreme manifestations. 
Conversely, those European economies that grew fastest had moderate 
demographic patterns and, at least in the case of England, moved further 
away from the EMP in the century before industrialization and during 
the Industrial Revolution itself.  
 Available evidence suggests that whether a society experienced 
economic growth depended not on its marriage or family pattern, but  
on wider characteristics of its economy and institutional framework.  
In early modern England, the EMP existed within a framework  
of reasonably well-functioning factor markets and relative economic 
freedom for women; economic growth was usually positive and 
ultimately spectacular. In the early modern Netherlands, the EMP 
initially existed in a similar framework of lively factor markets  
and successful economic growth; but later the economy stagnated  
and industrialization came late, for reasons that are still vigorously 
debated. In German-speaking central Europe and the Czech lands,  
the EMP existed in a more coercive framework of interlinked factor 
markets, mobility restrictions (including, in some areas, serfdom),  
and corporative barriers to entry (for most women and many men); 
economic growth remained slow until these institutional obstacles  
were removed. In parts of southern Europe, nuclear-family households 
were formed at marriage, but female marriage age, celibacy, and labor 
force participation were low. In other southern European societies, 
female marriage age and celibacy were high but women’s work was 
severely constrained by nonfamilial institutions. In many parts of  
the Mediterranean region, economic growth was strong before c. 1500 
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and unimpressive thereafter. Under serfdom in Russia, at least in some  
regions, female labor force participation was high and substantial 
proportions of women remained unmarried, but complex households 
were still widespread; both male and female serfs grappled with 
daunting institutional constraints; economic growth was slow.  
 What is needed is a theoretically coherent and empirically satisfactory 
account of how particular aspects of the EMP were connected to the 
wider institutional context, and which demographic and institutional 
features were responsible for which economic outcomes. We would 
speculate, based on current scholarship, that the demographic practices 
highlighted in the EMP were only possible within a wider social 
framework of strong nonfamilial institutions that could substitute for 
familial labor, insurance and welfare services that were unavailable to 
unmarried individuals and fragile nuclear families. However, it was not 
inevitable that this wider framework should consist of institutions that 
also benefited the economy, such as well-functioning factor markets or 
impartial legal systems, instead of those with more ambiguous growth 
effects such as serfdom, guilds, communities, religious bodies, or 
absolutist states. Future research, we suggest, must place at the 
center of analysis the nonfamilial institutions that circumscribed 
both demographic and economic decisions during European economic 
development. 
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